The purpose of this paper is to investigate what affected the post-crisis exchange rates of three ASEAN countries: Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. Our critical departure from previous studies is the use of intra-daily exchange rates. The use of the intra-daily data is useful in removing possible estimation biases which the choice of numéraire may cause. It can also contrast exchange rate movements during the time zone when the government intervention is active with those when the intervention is not active. We examine how and when the ASEAN currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen. We find significant structural breaks in the correlations during the time zone when East Asian market is open. In the post-crisis period, the first structural break happened when Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate and the second break happened when some East Asian countries introduced inflation targeting. The structural breaks suggest strong monetary and real linkages among the ASEAN countries. JEL classification numbers: F31, F33, F36
Introduction
The analysis of implications of alternative exchange rate regime has been one of the most important questions in international economics. In particular, an appropriate exchange rate regime for Asian countries has been a popular topic since the Asian currency crisis of 1997-98. Most of the empirical discussion on exchange rate regimes has used the de jure regime as compiled by the IMF, which is based on the regime the country declares to be running. However, many countries that adopt the de jure flexible rate intervene in foreign exchange markets so frequently. Their observable performances thus have very little difference from those of countries that have explicit fixed exchange rates. 1 Conversely, frequent devaluations of pegs in inflation-prone countries are the result of the implementation of monetary and fiscal policies that are inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate. Moreover, countries that appear to behave according to the declared regime during tranquil times may be tempted to change their course of action once the regime is under stress.
Thus, a very different picture of exchange rate regime choices may appear once the international context becomes more volatile.
In the pre-crisis period, it was widely documented that currencies of most East Asian economies maintained de facto pegs to the US dollar (see, for example, Frankel and Wei, 1994 , Goldberg and Klein, 1997 , and Ogawa, 2001 ).
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One of the lessons from the Asian currency crisis of 1997-98 was, however, that the de facto dollar peg is an inappropriate exchange rate regime for a typical Asian emerging economy, which has a diversified set of trading partners, the US, Japan, EU, and neighboring Asian countries. The real "effective" exchange rate of the typical Asian country frequently fluctuated as the third currencies-the yen and the European currencies-fluctuated vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. In particular, as the Japanese yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar from April 1995 to the summer of 1997, appreciation of the real effective exchange rates reduced the export competitiveness and increased current account deficits in the East Asian economies (see, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1999, and Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki, 1998 ).
In the post-crisis period, Hong Kong kept its currency board arrangement and the Chinese yuan virtually maintained its peg to the U.S. dollar. However, most of the other East Asian economies have adopted managed float after the crisis. Hernández and Montiel (2001) have suggested that they are now allowed to float more at low frequencies than before 1997-98. Some other observers, in contrast, have argued that the so-called floating exchange regimes of the countries are not really floating when we look at high-frequency day-to-day observations (Kawai and Akiyama, 2000 , McKinnon, 2001 , McKinnon and Schnabl, 2004 , and Fukuda, 2006 . In particular, using a regression framework developed by Frankel and Wei (1994) , McKinnon asserts that the East Asian countries have fallen back to the soft dollar peg.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the previous regression framework and to investigate what affected the post-crisis exchange rates of three ASEAN countries: Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. 3 Our critical departure from previous studies is the use of intra-daily exchange rates.
Intra-daily exchange rates have widely been used in recent literature. A limited number of studies, however, used them to explore exchange rate regimes. The use of the intra-daily data is useful in removing possible estimation biases which the choice of numéraire may cause. It can also contrast exchange rate movements during the time zone when the government intervention is active with those when the intervention is not active.
Based on the intra-daily exchange rates, we examine how and when the ASEAN currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen. During the time zone when the US market is open and when the East Asian market is closed, structural breaks were less clear throughout the post-crisis period. We, however, find significant structural breaks in the correlations during the time zone when the East Asian market is open. In the post-crisis period, the ASEAN currencies temporarily increased correlations with the Japanese yen. The increased correlations were particularly conspicuous before September 1st 1998. However, after Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate, both the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht increased correlations with the U.S. dollar even during the time zone when the intervention is active.
Except for Malaysia that started pegging to the U.S. dollar on September 1st 1998, the ASEAN countries had no institutional switch of exchange rate regimes in the post-crisis period. It is thus far from clear why the ASEAN currencies increased their links to the U.S. dollar in the late 1990s. A noteworthy implication from our empirical results is that a regime switch in an ASEAN country had an enormously large impact on the exchange rates of other ASEAN countries that had no regime switch. This probably reflects the fact that economic linkages among the ASEAN countries are tight in monetary and real transactions. A regime switch in a country had a strong impact on its neighboring economies and that the affected economies had another impacts on their neighboring economies. Our empirical studies support this view and suggest that the exchange rate linkage was very important to see why the post-crisis ASEAN countries had a tendency reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar.
In recent literature, several studies proposed a new de facto classification of exchange rate regimes that reflects actual rather than announced policies, and constructed a de facto classification from IMF-reporting countries. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) defined exchange rate regimes according to the behavior of three classification variables: changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these variables, and the volatility of international reserves. Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) constructed a de facto classification based on market-determined parallel exchange rates and inflation rates. Their approaches are useful in identifying the de facto exchange rate regime in long-run. However, the approach may not be useful in evaluating the post-crisis exchange rate regimes in East Asia where the regimes could have changed frequently during short-periods. More importantly, the approach is not suitable for countries such as Singapore that adopt intermediate exchange regimes, particularly undisclosed basket pegs.
Since East Asian countries have diversified trade structure, the currency needs to track the weighted average of the trading partners' currencies in order to stabilize the real effective exchange rate. Several economists have proposed the desirability of intermediate exchange rate regimes in East Asia that might stabilize their effective exchange rates (see, for example, Bénassy-Quéré, 1999 , Williamson, 1999 , 2000 , Rajan, 2002 . In the post-crisis period, foreign reserves have increased in all Asian countries, proving that they have intervening, managing the pressure on the currency to appreciate. It seems that increasing foreign reserves is an intended policy of many Asian central banks. The regime of Asian currencies is thus more or less managed float. However, it is far from clear whether they are more motivated by exchange rate stability, that is, "fear of float" a la Calvo and Reinhart (2002) , or deliberate building up of the foreign exchange reserves, that is, the war chest for a battle against hedge funds. It is thus very important to explore how and when the East Asian currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the other major currencies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the method of estimations and the data.
Section 3 theoretically explores how the choice of numéraire may affect the estimated coefficients.
Section 4 investigates the timings of structural changes to determine alternative sub-sample periods.
Sections 5 provides our estimation results and examines what impacts the regime switches in some ASEAN countries had on the post-crisis exchange regimes in the ASEAN countries. Section 6 examines how volatility of exchange rates changed in the post-crisis period. After providing alternative interpretations in section 7, section 8 summarizes our main results and refers to their implications.
The Estimation Method and Data
In order to investigate the determinants of exchange rates in the ASEAN countries, we use an extended version of the method of Frankel-Wei to estimate the weights of major currencies (that is, the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Sterling pound) before and after the crisis.
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The Frankel-Wei method is a pioneering method to measure the weights of a basket that the currency of a developing country is explicitly or implicitly based. In this approach, an independent currency is chosen as an arbitrary numéraire for measuring the exchange variation. The goal is to estimate the weight a currency assigns to another currency on a given frequency. Suppose that X j t is the exchange rate of an ASEAN country j, where j = Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Suppose also that USD t is the US dollar, JPY t is the Japanese yen, and SP t is the Sterling pound. The estimated model, where the local currency's value is regressed against the major world currencies, is then written as
where ∆E t is the growth rate of the exchange rate E t . A heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix is calculated by the method of Newey and West (1987) . As in the previous studies, the following analysis will use the Swiss franc as a numéraire. The Swiss franc has a desirable property as a numéraire because it is widely transacted in international markets but has little linkage with the ASEAN currencies.
Unlike previous studies, the data of each currency's exchange rate is intra-daily data. The data set was downloaded from Datastream. Datastream provides several series of daily data in different foreign exchange markets, which allow us to obtain exchange rates in different times. We downloaded daily data series from four alternative sources: noon in New York market from NY FED, 6PM in New York market from GTIS, 10AM in Tokyo market from MUFG, and 5:30PM in Singapore market. Combining these series, we constructed our series of intra-daily data. As is summarized in Table 1 Define the change in the log of country i's nominal exchange rate in terms of country j's currency by e ij . Denote the change in the log of country i's money supply by ∆m i and the change in the log of country i's non-monetary shock by ∆ε i which is assumed to be independently identically distributed over time. Then, the standard log-linear monetary approach implies that
We suppose that country S's currency is the numéraire currency and that country A's and country J's currencies are the major currencies on which currency i may put some basket weights. Then, August 11, 1997. When the data from MUFG is not available, we used 9am data in the Korean market. 6 For simplicity, we reduced the number of the major currencies from three to two in the following discussions.
assuming that all of countries S, A, and J keep their money supply constant under the flexible exchange rate (that is, ∆m S = ∆m A = ∆m J = 0), equation (2) leads to the changes in the log of country i's, country A's, and country J's exchange rates as follows (3a)
Therefore, when country i is a country the currency of which we need to measure the basket weights, When country i's de facto regime is the fixed exchange rate regime that pegs its currency to country A's currency, it holds that ∆m i = ε A -ε i because ∆m i is adjusted so as to satisfy that ∆e iA = 0.
By using (3a), (3b), and (3c), equation (4) is thus equivalent to estimating
It is easy to see that the estimates of (5) by the ordinary least squares lead that α = 1 and β = 0.
This indicates that the Frankel-Wei method can identify the regime correctly when country i's currency adopts the fixed exchange regime.
In contrast, when country i's de facto regime is the flexible exchange rate regime that allows its currency independently floating, it holds that ∆m i = 0. By using (3a), (3b), and (3c), equation (4) is then equivalent to estimating
It is easy to show that the estimates of (6) by the ordinary least squares lead to In the following analysis, we remove the possible estimation biases by using the intra-daily data.
The basic idea is that we could identify the exchange rate regime correctly during the time zones when there is no country-specific shock in numéraire currency. In our estimation, we use the Swiss franc as a numéraire. The exchange rates denominated by the Swiss franc would thus show spurious correlations in equation (1) 
The Alternative Sample Periods
We estimate equation (1) for two alternative time zones in four alternative sample periods: (i) from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997, (ii) from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998, (iii) from the September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999, and (iv) from January 4th 2000 to December 30th 2002. The period (i) is the pre-crisis period. We chose this period in order to see whether the previous results during the pre-crisis period are still confirmed by our intra-daily data. We break the post-crisis period into (ii), (iii), and (iv). In the post-crisis period, two structural breaks are assumed to arise when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate regime and when some ASEAN countries introduced inflation targeting.
The first break is a natural choice because the Malaysian regime shift was the only drastic switch of the exchange rate regime in the post-crisis East Asian countries. Before shifting to the fixed exchange rate regime, Malaysia was under managed float after the crisis. In particular, since early 1998, the Malaysian government had explored a new economic policy, including the stabilization policy of real effective exchange rates of the ringgit.
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The introduction of the fixed exchange rate on September 1st 1998 was therefore a dramatic regime shift in Malaysia (see Figure 1 ). In the following analysis, we start the estimation period of (ii) from the beginning of February 1998. This is because except for the Indonesian Rupiah, most of the East Asian countries almost stabilized the exchange rates after the end of January 1998.
The choice of the second structural break may be controversial. However, the regime shift in monetary policy can affect the exchange rate policy. In particular, when the share of imports in consumption goods is large, it is important to control exchange rates to achieve the inflation target.
7 For example, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), which was established by Prime Minister Mahathir in December 1997, announced the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) in August 1998. The plan stressed the importance of stabilizing the real "effective" exchange rates and proposed the adoption of a trade weighted basket system as a desirable exchange rate regime. The plan was based on the idea that the de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar sometimes destabilized the real "effective" exchange rates. In the following analysis, we investigate whether there were structural breaks in equation (1). In particular, we explore the existence of structural changes not only in the country that had a regime shift in monetary policy but also in other countries that did not. The motivation is to see whether a regime switch in an ASEAN country had a significant impact on the exchange rates of the other ASEAN countries that had no regime switch. If economic linkages among the ASEAN countries are tight in monetary and real transactions, a regime switch in a country would have a strong impact on its neighboring economies and that the affected economies would have another impact on their neighboring economies. Based on the intra-daily exchange rates, we first estimate equation (1) for the two alternative time zones from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997. We made the estimations to see whether the previous results during the pre-crisis period are still confirmed by our intra-daily data. Our estimations are different from previous studies not only in the sample period but also in the data frequency. The results can thus be different from previous ones that were estimated based on less frequency data such as daily, weakly, or monthly data. Table 3 (ii) From February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998
We next estimate equation (1) for the two alternative time zones in the post-crisis period before the Malaysian government shifted its exchange rate regime from managed float to the fix exchange rate.
After the Thai crisis in July 1997, several East Asian countries experienced serious currency devaluations. During the crisis, the market values of the Malaysia ringgit and the Thai baht that had moved to managed float dropped to nearly half of the pre-crisis level until January 1998. It was after the end of January 1998 when these currencies were almost stabilized. We thus estimate equation (1) from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998.
8 Table 4 summarizes the estimation results. Compared with those in Table 3 , the adjusted R The third is that the most dramatic structural change occurred in Malaysia. In Malaysia, the coefficient of the Japanese yen was significantly positive even when the US market was open, while that of the US dollar was not significant in both time zones. The result probably reflects the fact that the Malaysian government explored a new economic policy, including the stabilization policy of real effective exchange rates before fixing the ringgit to the US dollar.
(iii) From the September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999
On September 1st 1998, the Malaysian government suddenly changed its exchange rate to the fixed exchange rate. It was the only drastic switch of the exchange rate regime that occurred in the post-crisis East Asian countries. In this sub-section, we estimate our basic equation after the Malaysian government shifted its exchange rate regime. Since α 1 = 1 and α 2 = α 3 =0 in Malaysia after September 1998, we estimated equation (1) only for Singapore and Thailand. The motivation is to investigate how the dramatic regime shift in Malaysia affected the exchange rates of these ASEAN countries that had no explicit regime switch. Table 6 Table 4 , we can see that the adjusted R 2 's became larger after the regime shift in Malaysia. This suggests that the ASEAN currencies reduced their idiosyncratic flexibility and increased correlations with the U.S. dollar after the regime shift. Comparing the results of two time zones suggest that the interventions by the ASEAN governments still kept some degree of links to the Japanese yen and the Sterling pound in their currencies in the sample period. But even during the time zone when the intervention is active, the ASEAN currencies reduced the correlations with the Japanese yen and increased the correlations with the U.S. dollar after the regime shift in Malaysia. This implies that the structural break in
Malaysia had a large impact on the exchange rates of the other ASEAN countries that had no regime switch but whose economic linkages with Malaysia had been very tight. were accompanied by some degree of flexibility where the Japanese yen had a significant weight. Table 9 reports the results of our structural break test after the introduction of inflation targeting.
Newey and West robust t-statistics are applied for the structural beak test pooling the data from the 
Comparison of the Exchange Rate Volatility
In the last section, we investigated how and when the ASEAN currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen. Our basic finding was that the ASEAN currencies temporarily increased correlations with the Japanese yen after the crisis but that two structural breaks increased correlations with the U.S. dollar. The high correlations with the U.S. dollar, however, did not necessarily mean that the ASEAN currencies have de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar. The increased correlations with the U.S. dollar after early 2000 were accompanied by some degree of flexibility and significant correlation with the Japanese yen both of which did not exist in the pre-crisis period.
To support this view, this section explores how the structural breaks affected the volatility of exchange rates in the post-crisis period by using the daily data. For the growth rate and the logged level, we calculate the standard errors of each ASEAN exchange rate against the U.S. dollar normalizing by its mean. For the long-term data, the standard error of the logged exchange rates may be less desirable than those of the growth rates because the exchange rates usually have unit roots. But the exchange rates sometime fluctuate around a constant par value in the short-run.
The ratios of standard errors for the logged levels may thus be an alternative measure that provides some information of short-term volatility. We assume the standard error of each ASEAN exchange rate in the pre-crisis period (that is, the standard error from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997) as the benchmark. We then explore how the standard errors changed from the benchmark in three sample periods: (i) from February 2nd 1998 to the end of August 1998, (ii) from September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999, and (iii) from January 4th 2000 to September 5th 2002.
For each sub-sample period, Table 10 -1 reports the ratios of the standard errors to the benchmark for the growth rates. The results are consistent with the view that the ASEAN currencies increased correlations with the U.S. dollar after two structural breaks. Comparing the ratios in the table, we see dramatic increases of the standard errors in the period (i). The increases occurred partly because the ASEAN currencies still experienced some turbulence and partly because ASEAN currencies increased correlations with the Japanese yen. The standard errors, however, declined steadily after September 1998. In particular, in period (iii), the ratios became lower than one in
Thailand and close to one in Singapore. This implies that in terms of the growth rates, the ASEAN exchange rates after 2000 had stability against the U.S. dollar that is almost comparable to those in the pre-crisis period. After the crisis, several ASEAN countries adopted different types of exchange rate regimes.
After experiencing some transitional regime, Malaysia started pegging to the U.S. dollar on September 1st 1998, while Thailand and Indonesia adopted managed float since the crisis.
Singapore kept the undisclosed basket peg. Mauro (2000, 2001) showed that on economic criteria, ASEAN appears less suited for a regional currency arrangement than Europe before the Maastricht Treaty, although the difference is not large. However, the de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar may destabilize the real "effective" exchange rates of these currencies.
The basket currency system that is advocated by Williamson (2000) is, to be precise, a basket band crawling system where the basket value is a reference rate. 
